ABSTRACT When a wearable device such as a smartwatch is paired with a host device, e.g., a smartphone, it is inevitable that a certain amount of data stored in the host device will be copied to the wearable device for initialization and personalization purposes. This incident may frequently occur with the Internet of Things. However, it is not well known, particularly among users, what type of data and how much of it is actually being copied or retained as a result of device pairing. Thus, it is unclear whether users are properly managing smartphones and smartwatches based on their stored data. In this regard, we coined a new term called data transfusion to describe the phenomenon in which a user experiences data transfer while pairing but without having any knowledge regarding the data. To the best of our knowledge, there are no previous studies that deal with how much sensitive data are transfused regardless of user consent, and how users perceive and behave toward such a phenomenon for smartwatches. As this is a significant issue with the Internet of Things, we tackle this problem in two ways. We first conduct an experimental study of data extraction from commodity devices such as in Android Wear, watchOS, and Tizen platforms, followed by a survey of 205 smartwatch users. The experimental study reveals that large amounts of sensitive data are being transfused without sufficient user notification. The survey demonstrates that users have lower risk perceptions for smartwatches than for smartphones in terms of security and privacy, but they tend to set the same passcode on both devices when needed. Based on the results, we perform risk assessment and discuss possible mitigation measures that involve volatile transfusion for securing the Internet of Things.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wearable computing devices are ''miniature'' electronic products worn by users, and they are rendering the coming era of the Internet of Things (IoT); particularly, the Industrial IoT (IIoT) looks very promising. In general, they lack a conventional user interface and have agile network connectivity. For example, the Apple Watch provides a ''38-or 42-mm'' force touch display and a tiny crown along with haptic engines, sensors, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi in ad-hoc mode for interactions only in the near-field range. Therefore, wearable computing devices require a host device such as a smartphone to enrich their connectivity, functionality, and usability.
First, a personal wearable device must be initially paired with the host device for new device initialization and personalization-this process is called pairing. For instance, the user initially needs to pair a new smartwatch with their smartphone through a Bluetooth or an NFC channel before use. The smartwatch is then allowed to communicate with the paired smartphone for further data updates and backups while in use, e.g., SMS notification, weather forecast update, and health record backup, even without requiring user awareness of the paired connections. Now, both devices may need to be attended at the same level. These incidents may happen more frequently in the IoT and IIoT even without user attention.
In this paper, we deal with data security problems that can occur in smartwatch device pairing and coin a new term called data transfusion. We approach the problem via a twofold study design. First, we conducted an experimental study to extract data from smartwatches paired with a smartphone in different phases. We considered three popular platforms, Android Wear, watchOS, and Tizen, in our experiments. Second, we conducted a survey to understand user perceptions and behavior with regard to data transfusion. Based on these studies, we performed risk assessment on smartwatches and discussed risk mitigation measures.
There have been previous studies that manipulated data extraction of smartwatches from forensic perspectives. These include Do et al. ' s work on Samsung Galaxy Gear [1] and Baggili et al. ' s work on Samsung Galaxy Gear2 Neo and LG G Watch [2] . D'Orazio et al. [3] performed detailed experimental studies on iOS devices from adversarial perspectives, and their results strongly support our study. Compared to these valuable studies, our study focuses on exploring the bare phenomenon called data transfusion (i.e., not only extracted data) through concrete experiments accompanied by user surveys and risk assessment. We extend our previous poster in this regard [4] . This is the first work to coin the term, data transfusion, and we believe its implication on security and privacy is promising to foster the further research for more devices in the IoT and IIoT.
The rest of this paper is organized as follow. We describe our threat model in Section 2. We then present experimental studies: data extraction experiments in Section 3 and user surveys in Section 4. We subsequently perform risk assessment in Section 5 and discuss possible mitigations in Section 6. We review the related work in Section 7 and conclude this paper in Section 8.
II. THREAT MODEL -DATA TRANSFUSION
Our main focus is on what happens in a wearable device due to pairing. For initialization and personalization, the devices need to exchange necessary data, particularly data stored in the host device that belongs to the user. For such data transferred from the host device, we set the following definitions.
Device pairing is a process that sets up the initial link between a wearable device and a host device to allow for further reciprocal interactions, and it necessarily includes a data exchange between the devices.
Data transfusion is a phenomenon caused by device pairing. The host device infuses a copy of its (locally stored) secret and/or private user data into the paired wearable device for further paired actions.
The following threat model then raises research questions about data transfusion. user set the same passcode to unlock both devices? If so, a resource-limited wearable device could be a good medium target to attack the host device. An adversary also has at least double the number of chances of guessing the passcode. Finally, we wondered if users are properly notified and are aware of such incidents and threats. The questions we raise are very relevant to the IIoT as well as the IoT in general.
III. DATA EXTRACTION STUDY A. EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND STUDY METHOD 1) EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We conducted an experiment on data extraction by considering data transfusion in actual user environments. As summarized in Table 1 , we attempted to extract stored data from five smartwatch models operating on three different platforms (Android Wear, watchOS, and Tizen), which represent a variety of other watches from existing researches and were updated with the latest version of the platform at the time of conducting the experiment. We also used a PC (MS Windows 10, Intel Core i7 4770k, 24GB RAM, 512GB SSD) for actual data extraction and further data analysis.
2) EXPERIMENT DESIGN
We retrieved data from three subsequent phases of device connections: t 1 , t 2 , and t 3 . Assuming that the watch is actually in use, it can be divided into a pairing process before use(t 1 ) and a process of using the actual device after pairing. In addition, the device usage process can be broken down into using built-in apps(t 2 ) and downloading additional apps(t 3 ). Figure 1 illustrates the state transition diagram of experiment phases. We applied distinct scenarios for t 1 , t 2 , and t 3 as described in Table 2 , 3 and 4. In phase t 1 , we disabled network interfaces and isolated the smartwatch to observe the data transfusion right after the initial pairing process. In t 2 , we let the smartwatch connect to the host smartphone to observe data transfusion in the basic user mode. In t 3 , we installed additional apps on the smartphone and the smartwatch to observe data transfusion during more advanced use. We also monitored the smartwatches to check if there is a proper prompt or warning message that notifies data transfusion during the entire experimental process.
For the experiment in phase t 1 , we considered that the user performs device pairing for a new smartwatch based on the default factory setting. The pairing process begins by connecting the smartwatch to the host smartphone using the app installed on the smartphone. We examined the notifications and prompt messages that the devices exchanged. To observe data transfusion during this phase, i.e., data transfusion of device pairing, we disabled network interfaces and isolated the smartwatch from its host smartphone right after the paring process was completed. We then connected the smartwatch to our PC for data extraction and analysis.
In phase t 2 , we considered that the user continues to use the smartwatch after initial device pairing process without installing any additional applications. We observed the basic usage of the smartwatch and its host device by considering actual scenarios, i.e., sending and receiving calls, messages, and e-mails. We also wrote memos and schedules on default apps and observed how the written information was displayed on the smartwatch. For the basic use case, we enabled network interfaces and simulated the basic use case by wearing the smartwatch and holding the smartphone.
In phase t 3 , we observed the user who used the smartwatch continuously from phase t 2 . We followed specific usage scenarios for using such fitness apps by wearing the smartwatch in the near-field range of the paired smartphone. In addition, we specifically set a lock password or passcode for the smartwatches. It should be noted that a lock setting is not provided in Tizen. To observe data transfusion in this phase, we installed additional apps. As one of the major functions of a smartwatch is the fitness function, we installed fitness apps such as Strava [5] and Endomondo [6] , which are thirdparty apps. Moreover, we recorded exercise information in real time and observed the differences.
3) DATA ACQUISITION METHOD
For Android Wear, we first leveraged the custom recovery image to acquire the root permission and booted the smartwatch into the custom recovery mode, which enables unlimited data access and USB debugging function. We then pulled the data directory or partition from the smartwatch to the PC with the Android Debug Bridge (ADB). For the LG G Watch, we flashed the custom recovery and extracted user data. Note that the bootloader may reject a custom image boot by default as it is locked-only the image signed with Google's private key can be booted in general circumstances [1] . However, as we exploited the bootloader vulnerability in Sony SmartWatch3, we did not need to flash the custom recovery image to Sony SmartWatch3. To extract data from SmartWatch3, it is possible to boot into the recovery or bootloader mode without submitting a lock pattern although SmartWatch3 was locked with the lock pattern [7] .
For Tizen, we used the Smart Development Bridge (SDB) to pull the data directory or partition from the smartwatch to the PC. First, we changed the SDB's operating mode into the root mode with the PC's console command. As root mode commands are disabled by default, we used Samsung's own mobile device flashing tool to flash the modified rootfs partition image file to the smartwatch. Then, we were able to enable SDB in the root mode and accessed the internal file system of the smartwatch [8] .
For watchOS, we externally observed the data transfusion phenomenon as a user because we were unable to bypass the locked state. We locate transfused data by ''using'' a smartwatch while its network interface is disabled, without identifying and penetrating the presence of data on the smartphone. At the end of each phase, we observed the transfused data in the app by disabling the network interface.
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the experiment, we extracted various types of transfused data from smartwatches at different phases. Table 5 illustrates the results of data transfusion in each phase according to the types of platform. 
1) COMMON RESULTS
We observed that contact information was transfused on all three platforms in phase t 1 , and E-mail and calendar data in phase t 2 . Although the user's SMS/MMS/Messenger messages and E-mails are perceived as very sensitive information by users; for example, evaluated with a high risk score according to the risk assessment in Section 5, they were also transfused. On Android Wear and watchOS, SMS/MMS/Messenger messages were transfused in phase t 1 , and on Tizen in phase t 2 .
2) INTERESTING RESULTS IN ANDROID WEAR a: HASHED LOCK PATTERN WAS FOUND
We retrieved the lock pattern from the Sony SmartWatch3, which was cryptographically hashed by SHA-1 from the data/system/gesture.key file. We were able to disable the pattern lock authentication simply by deleting the file in the custom recovery mode. Once deleted, the SmartWatch3 stopped asking users to unlock the lock pattern. Furthermore, we were able to crack the hashed lock pattern by generating a rainbow table with a simple Python script, as shown in Figure 8 at Appendix A [9] . This indicates that the host smartphone paired to this smartwatch can also be unlocked if users set the same lock pattern on both devices.
b: UNUSED Wi-Fi SSID/PASSWORD WAS FOUND
We extracted Wi-Fi connection information such as Wi-Fi SSID, Wi-Fi password, and encryption type (WPA-PSK) from data\misc\wifi\wpa_supplicant.conf file, as shown in Figure 9 at Appendix A. Although the smartwatch never accessed Wi-Fi networks, we were able to retrieve the SSID and password pairs of the networks, previously accessed by the paired smartphone but not by the smartwatch. This indicates that some sensitive data that were never used by the smartwatch but used by the paired smartphone were leaked from the smartwatch.
c: THERE WAS NO WARNING MESSAGE NOTIFYING DATA TRANSFUSION
We were able to observe transfusion of user-specific data even in phase t 1 without explicit or obvious notifications or warnings. We could not find any alerts in phases t 2 and t 3 either.
d: DATA FROM A THIRD-PARTY APP WAS EASILY FOUND
Moreover, we observed data transfusion of fitness data from the additionally installed fitness app Strava, as shown in Figure 10 at Appendix A. We were able to extract the user's private data such as time, latitude, longitude, altitude, accuracy, speed, bearing, elapsed time, and distance based on user information and current time. Surprisingly, the fitness data were stored without any encryptions.
3) INTERESTING RESULTS IN TIZEN
The same data transfusion results were observed in phases t 2 and t 3 , where Tizen's default is the unlocked state. This is because Tizen does not store any data for additionally installed applications. We were unable to observe data transfusions for memo, Wi-Fi SSID/password, location, and hostinstalled apps in our experiment.
4) INTERESTING RESULTS IN WATCHOS
Unlike other platforms, we observed less data transfusion in Apple Watch. Contact information and SMS/MMS messages were transfused during the initial pairing stage t 1 , which demonstrated the same results as Android Wear. E-mail and host-installed apps were transfused in phase t 2 . Interestingly, photos and fitness data were not yet observed in the watch but are likely to be transfused with further use. We were unable to observe data transfusion phenomenon for memo, Wi-Fi SSID/password, location, and host device information data in our experiment. For more information, we believe that a jailbreak will be necessary in a future study.
IV. USER SURVEY STUDY
In this section, we present the results of our survey. We conducted a survey to obtain an overview of users' perceptions regarding usability and security when using a smartwatch, VOLUME 6, 2018 i.e., for behavioral transfusion [10] , [11] . Most people act on perceived risks rather than actual risks, which is closely related to user expectations or preferences. Perceived risk lies between user expectations or preferences and the risks that users tolerate, i.e., appropriate level of inherent risk [12] . Our survey is based upon the general view that understanding user perception is very important for managing risk in computing environments. It is crucial that a user realizes what he or she perceives against the potential risks.
A. SURVEY DESIGN AND STUDY METHOD
Our survey aims to empirically understand how users think about the data transfusion phenomenon. For the survey, we noted research questions that satisfy our purpose.
Research Questions: We prepare survey questionnaires based on the following research questions.
(1) Risk perception: Do users perceive the risks of a smartwatch and smartphone to a similar degree? (2) Are users aware of the following risks of a smartwatch?
-private data access and data transfer from the smartphone (3) Do users prefer the same passcode for both devices?
1) SURVEY DESIGN
In the next subsections, we describe how we designed the survey, what type of methods we used, and who participated in our survey. Before venturing into the real-world survey, we first conducted interviews based on an in-lab pilot study. Then, we went on to conduct a quantified online survey.
To draw aimed research questions, we made a detailed questionnaire comprising 23 questions with five main parts: Part 1. Demographic questions (e.g., age, gender, education, and occupation) Part 2. Behavioral usage patterns for smartphone and smartwatch Part 3. (Un)locking mechanism and password on smartphone and smartwatch Part 4. Security and privacy-related questions Part 5. Awareness of notifications and user perceptions on data transfusion
2) SURVEY METHOD
We performed a two-part survey for our evaluation: an inlab pilot study and an online survey. For the in-lab pilot study, we conducted paper surveys with 16 participants. To obtain feedback, we conducted interviews with each participant, asking for details and excluding these 16 people from the later survey results. We organized our previous survey questions and then conducted an online survey locally from August 1, 2016, to September 30, 2016 . We informed the participants in advance that they can only take the survey if they use both a smartphone and a smartwatch. We validated actual smartwatch users by requiring them to take a picture of the message that we sent. Users sent back the picture, as shown in Figure 12 at Appendix B. Every message included a different authentication code.
3) PARTICIPANTS
We attempted to recruit 223 participants who use both a smartphone and smartwatch and eliminated 18 people who missed some questions or replied inappropriate responses. Consequently, we were able to gather only 205 participants (189 self-identified as male and 16 as female) between 21 and 61 years of age, with a median age of 36. The percentage share of smartwatch platforms was as follows: 49% were Samsung gear users, 43% were Apple Watch users, and 8% were others. We present our observations and analysis in the following subsections.
B. LOWER SECURITY PERCEPTION ON SMARTWATCH THAN ON SMARTPHONE
To obtain a quantitative and qualitative understanding of how users' risk perceptions vary for smartphones and smartwatches, we compared participants' risk perceptions for smartwatches to that for smartphones in three perspectives: 1) data storing, 2) data leakage possibilities, and 3) security threats when lost. The data follows a normal distribution and all three results show lower percentage for smartwatches compared to smartphones, which indicates that users have lower risk perceptions for smartwatches.
1) AWARENESS OF DATA STORING
We asked participants if they think their personal data can be stored in a smartphone or smartwatch. For smartphones, 84.9% answered yes while 76.6% answered yes for smartwatches, Approximately 86.2% of participants who were aware that data can be stored in a smartphone think that the same data can be also stored in a smartwatch. The results revealed a significant difference with the paired t-test (t = −3.118, p < .05, n=205).
2) AWARENESS OF DATA LEAKAGE POSSIBILITIES
In terms of data leakage, we asked the participants if they think that their personal data can be leaked from the smartphone or the smartwatch, separately. For smartphones, 85.9% answered yes while 79.5% answered yes for smartwatches. Approximately 88.1% of participants who were aware of the possibility of data leakage from a smartphone think that data can be also leaked from a smartwatch. In addition, we observed a statistically significant difference in awareness of data leakage from smartphones and smartwatches with the paired t-tests (t = −2.443, p < .05, n=205).
3) AWARENESS OF SECURITY THREAT
Finally, we asked the participants if the loss of their devices could be a security threat. For smartphones, 72.2% answered yes while 67.3% answered yes for smartwatches. Approximately 87.8% of participants who were aware of security threats if they lose their smartphone think that it can also happen with smartwatches. We performed paired t-tests of the results for smartphones and smartwatches, and these showed significant difference (t = −1.975, p < .05, n=205). 
C. MODERATE PERCEPTION OF DATA TRANSFUSION
It is necessary to receive notification messages that indicate that sensitive data such as contact list, call records, and GPS data in a smartphone can be transferred to a smartwatch when paired. Apple, Sony, and LG smartwatches send users a notification message, whereas Samsung Gear does not. We separated participants into these two groups and asked them whether they saw the notification message. Among users who used a smartwatch with the notification message, only 50% answered that they have seen it. For 57% of users whose smartwatch lacked notification regarding the message answered that they have seen the notification message. These results imply that irrespective of whether smartwatches have notification functionality, users remain unaffected. Furthermore, 85.2% of people who were initially aware of data transfusion were also aware of it when in use. Initial awareness plays a significant role in continuous awareness, putting more weight on the extreme necessity of welldefined notifications in a smartwatch from the initial pairing process.
From the experimental study in section III, sensitive data stored in smartphones transfuse to smartwatches unintentionally. Thus, it is necessary to have notification messages that indicate that some sensitive data in the smartphone such as contact list, call records and GPS data can be transferred to the smartwatch when paired. We will determine the effectiveness of notification messages and how these relate to users' awareness of data transfusion. First, we set 194 participants out of 205 who are using Apple, Sony, and LG watches, and Samsung Gear. Then, we divided these participants into two groups depending on the existence of a notification message: Apple, Sony, and LG watches show the notification message in the paired smartphone but not Samsung Gear. Out of 194 users, 94 were using Apple, Sony, and LG watches which have a notification functionality, and 100 owned Samsung Gear, which lacks a notification functionality.
1) NOTIFICATION MESSAGE
Within these two groups, separated according to those using devices with and without notifications, we asked if they recall ever seeing the notification message. Interestingly, out of the 94 users who actually owned smartwatches that have a notification message, only 50% answered that they have seen it. Moreover, 57% of the users whose smartwatches do not notice the prompt message answered that they have seen the notification message (See Figure 2 (a) and (b) ). These results imply that irrespective of whether the smartwatches have notifications, users remain unaffected. The results of the chi-square test support the finding that these two groups are statistically insignificant with the question asking if they have seen the notification message (χ 2 (1)=0.955, p = .329).
2) PAIRING AND DATA TRANSFUSION
We also asked the 194 participants if they were aware of data transfusion when their devices were initially paired (t 1 ) and when in use (t 2 or t 3 ). For each, 73.2% and 69.1% of the participants answered that they were. Figure 2 (c) and (d) show specific survey results of how much users were aware of data transfusion. Additionally, 85.2% of people who were aware of the initial data transfusion (t 1 ) were aware of it when their devices were in use (t 2 or t 3 ). A chi-square test yielded statistically significant results (χ 2 (1)=64.594, p < .001), meaning that initial awareness plays a significant role in the continuous awareness of data transfusion. This result puts more weight on the necessity of providing well-defined notifications on smartwatches during the initial pairing process. With the specific initial notification message, users will have proper awareness of data transfusion while continuously using the device.
D. USER'S BEHAVIORAL PRACTICE DIFFERENT FROM USER PERCEPTION
Based on the results that showed that users tend to have lower risk perception for smartwatches than for smartphones, FIGURE 2. Distribution of users' awareness.
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we tried to determine users' actual behavior in the real world. That is, we considered passcode setting as the actual user behavior and expect users to set different passcodes for their respective devices. Thus, we asked participants if they are using same (un)locking mechanism or even the same passcode for both their smartphone and smartwatch.
1) TYPE OF USING (UN)LOCKING MECHANISM
When setting the passcode on a smartphone, users choose the type of passcode or (un)locking mechanism they will use. (Un)locking mechanisms come in four types: four-digit PINs, longer than four-digit PINs, pattern lock, and none. We asked participants to identify the type of (un)locking mechanism they use on their smartphones and smartwatches in separate questions. Consequently, the usage ratio showed similarly and highly as follows on both the smartwatch and the smartphone: four-digit PINs > pattern lock > longer than four-digit PINs.
2) SAME PASSCODE ON BOTH DEVICES
We analyzed the relationship between whether users use same (un)locking mechanism and the real passcode that they actually use. We asked participants if they actually used or will use the same passcode on both their smartphone and smartwatch. Of 205 participants, 69.8% said that they will use the same passcode. Moreover, 78% of participants using the same locking method actually use the same passcode on both their smartphone and smartwatch. This indicates that when using an (un)locking mechanism, the majority of users seem to set identical passcodes on both their devices. This is especially true for Apple Watch users, with 78% saying that they use and will use the same passcode. There were also some Android Wear users who did not even know that they could set a passcode. Surprisingly, some people who have lost or left their smartwatch someplace before still set the same passcode for their smartphone. This is a good example of how a user's actual behavior is far below than their awareness.
3) WEAK SECURITY ACTION
Even though smartwatch users have a high level of awareness of actual risks in terms of security and data transfusion, they do not behave as if they do. Most people act on perceived risk rather than actual risk, which is closely related to user expectations or preferences. This study demonstrates that there is a gap between the perceived risk and the actual risk, which leads to severe security risk. Users seem to presume the risks; do not fully understand the potential risks, threats, and implications; and tend to underestimate these issues.
V. RISK ASSESSMENT
From the experimental results, we observed that sensitive data were transfused from a smartphone to a smartwatch. Subsequently, we performed risk assessment of smartwatch data by considering the transfused user-specific data as an asset [13] - [16] . This paper builds upon previous research on smartphone data risk assessments and proposes integrated risk assessment results for the smartwatch. For our study, we considered the smartwatch as a single-entity device that exchanges data with the smartphone. First, we classified data into four categories depending on the context of the data: control of device, communications, sensor data, and userwritten data. Second, we defined the data and assigned impact scores in terms of security and privacy. Finally, we calculated risk scores by multiplying the impact score and likelihood score of transfused data as follows.
A. ASSET CATEGORIZATION
For asset categorization, we defined and classified transfused data and then assigned the impact score. We defined and classified data into four categories, as shown in Table 7 . We determined the impact score based on security and privacy, as represented in Figure 3 . In many cases, data disclosure may cause both security and privacy problems, and we manipulated data into two types of impact: security and privacy, each on three levels [15] , [17] . Then, we assigned the extracted data with a five-scale impact score as listed in Table 8 . If both security and privacy levels indicate the maximum level three, we set that as the highest impact score five. We assume that if one of them has a high enough impact score, it assures higher risk. Moreover, if either one indicates maximum level three, we regard it as level four, and so on. The following notes specifically indicate a description of the risk levels. We sorted the data according to impact scores, arranged from highest to lowest in Table 9 . 
1) VERY HIGH
The user must not disclose or publicize such data because disclosure may cause serious privacy infringement and security problems. Thus, we assigned the hashed lock pattern as Very High as users will never share their passcodes. From the survey in Section IV-D1, we observed that 78% of participants who were using the same locking mechanism on both their smartphone and smartwatch also used the same passcode on both devices. Thus, a breach of lock pattern will provide almost complete access to both devices, which raises both critical security and privacy issues.
2) HIGH
Data in this category includes information that shows users' recent information such as GPS location and e-mail and SMS/MMS/Messenger messages. We can predict and track user behavior or further actions based on this information.
In particular, e-mail and SMS/MMS messages exposed information on acquaintances or companies in organizations.
3) MODERATE
A user may not disclose or publicize such data in general because disclosure may cause a security problem; however, users may sometimes be willing to share data such as photos, fitness data, and contact information with authorized people. Tracking user behavior based on these data is difficult, but the disclosure of these data can still cause security and privacy problems.
4) LOW
The user generally can share this type of data with acquaintances by simply showing it to them or posting it on social media. Partial information related to device settings are assigned two out of three in terms of privacy level, but it hardly causes security threats. Further, user-written data have an impact solely on privacy perspectives.
5) VERY LOW
Data with low impact on both security and privacy levels. A user may not be concerned about disclosing such data in general because disclosure may not cause a privacy infringement problem. For example, host-installed apps have no value in terms of distinguishing the right user.
B. RISK SCORING
We performed risk assessment on smartwatches based on previous works [13] , [17] . The majority of studies calculate risk scores based upon standard formula, giving impact score to data and then multiplying the likelihood score to the corresponding threat. For our study, we modified the risk assessment method for smartphones to suit our work on the smartwatch. We considered the impact of data as stated above and considered the probability of data presence in the smartwatch.
The data to be transfused varies according to the transfusion phase. To reflect this, we scored the points that were likely to be transfused for each data as a likelihood score. The likelihood, as we experimented independently on different platforms, must be a value that is different according to the platform. The earlier the data is transfused, the greater is the threat and vulnerability. We assigned different levels of likelihood scores to each phase: t 1 as 3 for high, t 2 as 2 for moderate, and t 3 as 1 for low. Data transfused in phase t 1 is designated as ''high (3)'' owing to the high possibility of their presence from the initial pairing process. For the same reason, data transfused in phases t 2 and t 3 are designated as ''moderate (2)'' and ''low (1),'' respectively. For instance, when a particular data is transfused from phase t 1 , it gains the level of ''high (3)'' for all three phases. We also assigned ''low (1)'' to unavailable data as they still have the possibility of being transfused at a certain point in the future.
We formulated the calculation of risk score as the following equation. It is calculated by multiplying the impact score and VOLUME 6, 2018 the likelihood score of each data.
Consequently, applying likelihood scores to each data and different platforms lead to distinct results depending on the type of platform. Figure 4 illustrates the integrated results of risk scores with predefined assets according to the time phase (t 1 , t 2 , and t 3 ) , discretely by platforms. It shows that risks for data in smartwatches are proportional to the elapsed time starting from the factory default stage, i.e., phase t 0 . The data accumulates over time and the sum of the risk scores at t 3 on each platform are as follows: Android Wear -78, Tizen -65, and watchOS -49. Figure 5 shows the risk score of transfused data on each platform at t 3 . It represents the risk score of each data and the distribution of risk. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND MITIGATION

A. DISCUSSION
There are meaningful results from both our experimental study and user survey on notifications for data transfusion. There was a weak indication only for Android Wear-based smartwatches and Android smartphones during the initial pairing sequence. In the case of Tizen and watchOS, we did not find any alerts or notifications. From the user study, irrespective of whether the device had an insufficient number of notifications, approximately half of the participants answered that they saw the notification message. This strongly supports the finding that the notification message does not affect users. After analyzing the extracted data and user perceptions from the smartwatch, we performed risk assessment under general usage situations, focusing on the data transfusion phenomenon, and presented risk levels with data descriptions. Security and privacy-related data transfused over time and risk scores increased with time. Furthermore, we established a possible attack scenario based on our experimental results, as illustrated in Table 10 .
B. MITIGATION 1) VOLATILE TRANSFUSION
For mitigation, if a smartwatch is isolated, we propose that transfused data be removed from the smartwatch after a certain amount of time according to the descending order of the priority, that is, from the highest priority based on our risk assessment levels shown in Figure 5 . When the original user returns and wears the smartwatch again, the data removed is re-transfused. We call this strategy volatile transfusion, which enables safe data deletion when the device is separated from its user or the host device.
2) NOTIFICATION INDUCING ACTIVE RESPONSE
As the lack of notifications is fatal from security and privacy perspectives, we propose to provide an explicit notification message to the user regarding data transfusion of high-priority data. It will also be considerable to request the user's active response, e.g., by swiping the items to be transfused. Swiping the data at the moment the user sees the notification message could be an appropriate way to encourage user participation, inducing an active response. [2] . They paired smartwatches with Samsung Galaxy S4 Active smartphones and used them under normal usage scenarios. By performing the scenarios, they dumped the user data partition from the selected smartwatch. Baggili, Ibrahim, et al. dumped the user data partition and categorized the retrieved information.
Do et al. [1] proposed a scenario and threat model for smartwatches in 2016. They demonstrated that they could retrieve various privacy data from the Samsung Galaxy Gear Live smartwatch by exploiting the bootloader vulnerability. They built a custom boot image to acquire root permission on the smartwatch and successfully extracted data from the smartwatch using the ADB interface.
D'Orazio et al. [3] studied iOS devices in detail from adversarial perspectives of data exfiltration. They demonstrated in detail how an attacker could exfiltrate data from a paired iOS device by exploiting a library and a command line tool distributed with iTunes. Their impressive results strongly support our study regarding data transfusion.
Kim [18] extracted data from the Samsung Galaxy Gear and an Android Wear-based smartwatch in 2013. Kim utilized the Cydia Impactor to acquire root permission on the smartwatch and used it to inject SuperSU and Busybox binary into the smartwatch. Then, Kim extracted user data partition from the smartwatch with root permission. Kim also analyzed and categorized the retrieved data.
Our study is more of an extended work as we extracted data from three types of platforms: Android Wear, Tizen, and watchOS. Unlike previous studies, we focused on the data transfusion phenomenon and conducted a survey and risk assessment based on data extraction experiments. Moreover, we organized three usage scenarios for smartwatches and observed data transfusion in four phases.
B. USER PERCEPTION
There are several studies on users' security and privacy perceptions for smartphones, comparing perceived risks with actual risks [19] , [20] . There is a significant difference between the actual risk and the perceived threat levels [21] .
Andriotis et al. [22] and Harbarch et al. [23] discussed trade-offs between usability and security for (un)locking methods. Users tend to use specific heuristics when they set patterns. In particular, Harbach et al. conducted a survey on how users perceived smartphone-related risks and observed that what users considered as sensitive data were seldom accessed. Egelman et al. [24] conducted an online survey to understand why people choose to lock or not lock their smartphones, and concluded that user perceptions underestimate the actual risks. In 2016, Harbarch et al. studied user interactions with smartphone unlocking mechanisms and their correlation to perceptions of smartphone-related risks.
They demonstrated how users reacted and interacted with locking mechanisms by conducting a user experiment and survey of unlocking events when a PIN or pattern was entered, correctly or incorrectly, time or length [25] .
It is important to consider the perceptions and responses of end users with digital identity technologies [10] . Users are typically concerned about privacy and security but do not necessarily understand how these issues are impacted by the use of digital identities. Although respondents seem unconcerned about the impact on their privacy when considered in a general sense, they do express agreement with specific concerns.
Most previous studies on user privacy concentrate on mobile devices and little is known about wearable devices. Based on studies on smartphones, our user study focused on user perception in terms of usability and security, targeting smartwatches paired with smartphones. Thus, from the transfusion perspective, we compared the awareness of smartwatches to that of smartphones.
C. RISK ASSESSMENT
With the lack of research focusing on smartwatches, the following studies on smartphones provided us with a meaningful basis for our research. Traditional risk assessment methods consider the smartphone as an entity of its own. Many of them are grounded on the international standard ISO/IEC 27005 [16] , which provides guidelines for information security risk management.
Hogben and Dekker [13] performed risk assessment for smartphones and identified actual risks and set impact and likelihood scores for possible security breach scenarios. Each scenario considered consumer, employee, and high-level official groups to illustrate risks in a more feasible manner. Although the purpose of the study was to address the risk for smartphones, the method used herein provided a basis for other risk assessment methods.
Theoharidou et al. [17] conducted risk assessment with case studies on the Android platform. They first identified assets and then classified data on the basis of information type and source. This paper evaluated risk with five scales with asset impact, permission likelihood, and threat likelihood.
Not only do different services and data require different security levels, how threats are derived from each service should also be considered independently [14] . They suggest security assessment with three levels combining the threat and type of access. Moreover, the same context could be assigned to take the different security requirements of various services into account. Ledermuller et al. assigned different levels to private users, corporate users, and hybrid users (both private and corporate) for the risk assessment of smartphones [15] . With a total level of 8, private user data are maximum 4, normally.
We rely on research that identifies assets first and classifies these on the basis of classified data. For our own risk assessment of smartwatches, we considered the smartwatch as a single-entity device that is paired with its host device, VOLUME 6, 2018 a smartphone. We also performed risk assessment focusing data transfusion in stages with four separate phases.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We conducted both experimental and survey studies on data extracted from smartwatches by focusing on the data transfusion phenomenon. We observed that rare notifications lowered user perceptions on data transfusion, which could trigger security or privacy-related incidents. Moreover, we proposed the risk assessment of smartwatch data into five risk levels by considering the data transfusion phase and conclude that the risks increase over time. To improve security and privacy, we suggest two mitigation measures: volatile transfusion and notification that induces an active response. Future work may include a longitudinal user study adopting the suggested mitigation measures with simulation experiments for more devices expected in the IoT and IIoT. We expect to observe the manner in which users react and find a compromise between usability and security when using smartwatches and more IoT devices.
APPENDIX A
Data artifact -We extracted the following data from Sony SmartWatch3 -Android Wear, and Samsung Galaxy GearTizen.
A. CONTACT AND SMS/MMS MESSAGES
We extracted the user's own contact information, SMS/MMS messages from data\com.google.android.gms\ databases\node.db file, as shown in Figure 6 . The images attached in the contact information were stored at data\com.google.android.gms\files\ assets. We were able to identify the data without additional process as it was unencrypted. 
B. CONTACT INFORMATION
We extracted the contact information from Samsung Galaxy Gear, as shown in Figure 7 . It was stored unencrypted in SQLite database file and were able to access the data using the SQLite database viewer.
C. HASHED LOCK PATTERN
We extracted the hashed lock pattern from SmartWatch3 and decrypted it as shown in Figure 8 . We were able to unlock the device with the retrieved lock pattern. Moreover, we disabled the lock pattern by deleting the files related to the lock pattern.
D. Wi-Fi SSID/PASSWORD Figure 9 shows the extracted Wi-Fi connection information accessed using a paired smartphone. We connected the revealed access point with the acquired Wi-Fi password to different devices, and the connection was successfully established. Figure 10 shows the fitness data extracted from the additionally installed app Strava. The data contains GPS location, speed, direction, and time-stamp values.
E. FITNESS DATA FROM STRAVA
F. FITNESS DATA FROM S HEALTH
We extracted fitness data from the default app called S Health in Samsung Galaxy Gear, as shown in Figure 11 . It stores user-specific information such as the user's age, weight, height, and measured fitness data, including steps involved while walking and running, calories burned, and speed in the apps\com.samsung.shealth\data\ .shealth.db file.
APPENDIX B
For the survey, we sent a message with an authentication code to the participants. Users verified themselves by clicking a picture of the message on their smartwatch and sending the verification pictures to us, as shown in Figure 12 .
